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SYMPOSIUM
FEDERALISM: THE BATTLE RECOMMENCES
Celebrating the 200h Anniversary of ClhefJohn Marshall's
Ascendancy to the US. Supreme Court
FOREWORD
PHILIP WEINBERG*
Tensions between the states and the federal government,
disagreement over the degree to which the Supreme Court can
restrict the ability of Congress to legislate and citizens to sue -
these concerns are as vivid today as in John Marshall's time. On
this bicentennial of our prime Chief Justice's accession, the legal
and political issues he and the nation faced are with us once
again-plus a change.
St. John's Law School is proud to host this homage to John
Marshall on his two hundredth anniversary as Chief Justice, and
to enable four eminent legal scholars to discuss the uncanny
reprise of the very issues he wrestled with, and wrote about so
eloquently. Many tend to see Marshall as a noble but vague
figure on a pedestal, author of the prodigious series of decisions
* Professor of Law, St. John's University of Law; J.D. Columbia Law School 1958. The
author teaches Constitutional Law and a Constitutional Rights Seminar and is editor-in-
chief of the MACMILLAN COMPENDIUM: THE SUPREME COURT (1999) as well as numerous
articles.
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establishing judicial review and delineating Congressional
power. In truth, as his two great biographers Charles Hobson
and Jean Edward Smith portray him, he was very much a
person: a Virginian Renaissance man, soldier, lawyer, state
legislator, congressman, diplomat and finally jurist. He served
with bravery and distinction under Washington at Brandywine
and Valley Forge. He studied law at the foot of George Wythe
and litigated many salient cases before representing the Republic
in Paris, holding his own in the XYZ Affair against the devious
Talleyrand. His devotion to his wife, Polly, was legendary.
Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice has been aptly
described: "He hit the Constitution much as the Lord hit the
chaos, at a time when everything needed creating.", And in truth
his background, experience and intellect highly qualified him,
and history bears out the greatness of his opinions - remarkably,
nearly all for a unanimous Court-sculpturing judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison,2  sustaining Congressional power in
McCulloch v. Maryland,3 unifying the nation's commerce in
Gibbons v. Ogden,4 and safeguarding right of contract from state
interference in Fletcher v. Peck5 and the Dartmouth College
I JOHN PAUL FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 62
(1958) quoted in JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 280
(1996). See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall's Questions, 2 GREEN BAG
2D 367, 367 (1999) (explaining Marshall's broad distinction between law and politics, and
how it gave shape to previously amorphous judicial branch); G. Edward White, The
Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1984) (outlining
undefined and commonly practiced extra-judicial activities of that time that would likely
be considered improper today).
2 5 U.S.137 (1803); see United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 396-97 (1990)
(showing that nearly 190 years after Marbury, premise of judicial review is still valid
despite specifically enumerated remedies by Congress); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury
and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1983) (arguing that Marbury
sheds new light on how judicial review should be treated in modern context of
administrative agencies).
3 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966)
(reiterating Marshall's McCulloch rationale of letter and spirit of Constitution in context
of limiting states' rights in establishing voter requirements in conflict with Congress's
Voting Rights Act of 1965); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
State and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHm. L. REV. 887, 929-31 (1982)
(explaining that Marshall's rationale in McCulloch to be most convincing in establishing
Congressional authority and in limiting states' power).
4 22 U.S. 1 (1824); see CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 140-47 (1996) (explaining significance of expansion of
Federal government's powers without upsetting public's normal desire for increased state
power or crippling states' rights to regulate trade); Currie, supra note 3, at 938-41
(defining limitations of states rights, which provided foundation for future judges to
expand Federal government's control of commerce).
5 10 U.S. 87 (1810); seeJames W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A
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Case6 and treaty rights in Worcester v. Georgia.7 Through all
this Marshall resisted extraordinary political suasion, from
presidents on down, and his opinions have definitively shaped
constitutional law and American history ever since.
Charles Hobson, biographer of Marshall and editor of the
multi-volume collection of his papers at the College of William
and Mary, describes his extraordinary influence on the Court,
"hitching its destiny to the Constitution itself," and yielding to
"neither power nor patronage." He portrays Marshall the person
and shows the influences that helped produce the great jurist.8
Martin Flaherty, professor at Fordham Law School, highlights
the vast importance of Marshall's McCulloch decision. 9 Marshall
there nailed to his masthead the idea that the Constitution
emanates from the people, not the states, a concept that,
ultimately, the Civil War was fought to preserve, and that was
recently reaffirmed by the Court in US. Term Limits v.
Thornton.10 As Professor Flaherty points out, to Marshall the
Reappraisal, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023,1035-36 (2000) (claiming that Marshall's
strong belief in Contract Clause was rooted in his respect for Constitution's framer's
strong valuation of private property as founding principle for United States); Samuel R.
Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall In Historical Perspective, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
137, 148 (1997) (stating Fletcher has achieved Marshall's goals of bolstering
Constitution's power through various political climates and majorities).
6 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); see Henry N.
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Regulating Corporate Takeovers: State Anti-Takeovers
Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 631-42 (1988) (examining
vitality of Dartmouth 's Contract Clause today measured against states' rights to alter
corporate contract); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist:
Dartmouth College v. Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 CONN. L. REV.
1665, 1666-67 (scrutinizing Marshall's ability to envision future utility of his decision at
time it was made, yet fully acknowledging importance that opinion has held in nation's
history).
7 31 U.S. 515 (1832); see Currie, supra note 4, at 953-55 (stating that Marshall
overanalyzed Worcester case by examining Federalism principles of Georgia ignoring
Federal Indian treaty, while explicit Constitutional authority existed).
8 See HOBSON, supra note 3, 140-47; see also JOHN MARSHALL, AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 3 (1937) reprinted in SMITH, supra note 1, at 21-22
(recollecting his father's influence during childhood, which outlined his hunger to learn);
ALLAN B. MAGRUDER, JOHN MARSHALL 251-73 (1972) (providing first-hand evidence of
Marshall's opinions on slavery, Andrew Jackson's administration, generosity and
importance of physical health).
9 Martin Flaherty, John Marshall and We the People, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. (forthcoming Spring 2002).
10 514 U.S. 779 (1995). See generally Polly J. Price, Term Limits On Original Intent?
An Essay On Legal Debate and Historical Understanding, 82 VA. L. REV. 493, 529-33
(considering hypothetical case involving electing convicted felon rather than limiting
number of terms of elected officials, and examining longstanding tradition of prohibiting
former during today's Federalism struggles); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling
Sovereignties: US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 105-09 (1995)
(explaining foreseeable implications of Term Limits decision in divided Supreme Court's
2002]
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Revolution itself established the principle; to the Chief Justice,
"union and resistance to... Great Britain were inseparable."'l
And to Flaherty the contrary view, espoused by Justice Thomas'
dissent in the Term Limits case, is built "on a foundation of
sand."12
Judge John Gibbons, who served for many years with
distinction on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, focuses on
Marshall's steadfast protection of individual rights under the
Contract Clause, 13 the only provision significantly safeguarding
personal autonomy from impairment by the states until the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, as shown by his
opinion in Fletcher v. Peck14  and again in Sturges v.
Crowninshieldi5  Judge Gibbons goes on to describe Marshall's
placing limits on the Eleventh Amendment in Cohens v.
Virginia,16 sustaining Supreme Court review of state criminal
convictions and rebuffing the state's claim that the Eleventh
struggle between Federal and states' rights).
I Flaherty, supra note 9.
12 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 796 n.12 (criticizing Justice
Thomas' dissent for improperly relying upon Powell decision, when this decision was not
based upon "default rule" of states' enjoyment of power in absence of Constitutional
mention); Flaherty, supra note 9.
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Right of
Privacy.- Past, Present, and Future, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 403, 407 n. 24 (1989)
(articulating that under Marshall, "the Court adopted a position linking all protection of
individual rights to the specific provisions of the Constitution."); Samuel R. Olken, Chief
Justice Marshall and the Course of American Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 743, 778 (2000) (suggesting that Marshall court Contract Clause jurisprudence
reflected effort to protect certain types of individual rights).
14 10 U.S. 87 (1810); see Olken, supra note 5, at 138 (stating that "the power of the
legislature over the lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly restrained."); see also
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings
Thesis "Goes Too Far", 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 238-239 (1999) (stating that decision in
Fletcher v. Peck suggests view of individual property rights as needing protection from
legislatures); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 81, 96-97 (2000) (stating that state government must behave under limitations of
private person); Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414, 1423 n.
67 (1984) (stating that Fletcher illustrates proposition that any unnecessary restriction by
state on contractual liberty, impermissibly invades realm of private rights). See generally
David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscovery of the
Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 362 n. 74 (1996) (citing authority as example
where Court enforced federal constitutional limitation on powers of state).
15 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819) (holding that state cannot pass bankruptcy law that
impairs obligations of contracts). See John Gibbons, Chief Justice John Marshall, 16 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. (forthcoming Spring 2002); see also Mayer, supra note 14, at
362 n. 74 (stating that Sturges case is example of judiciary imposing constitutional
limitations on states); Note supra note 14, at 1424 (stating that Sturges illustrates
proposition that any unnecessary restriction by state on contractual liberty,
impermissibly invades realm of private rights).
16 19 U.S. 264 (1821). See Gibbons, supra note 15.
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Amendment barred such review.1 7 Universally accepted now, the
Cohens decision was highly controversial, and gave rise to a
popular verse:
Old Johnny Marshall, what's got in ye,
To side with Cohens against Virginny...
You've thrown the whole state in terror
By this infernal writ of error.18
As Judge Gibbons notes, Marshall would likely have been
appalled at the recent string of 5-to-4 rulings using the Eleventh
Amendment and state sovereignty arguments to bar suits in
federal as well as state courts against states assertedly violating
federal law.19  Gibbons believes Marshall "a wiser political
philosopher than we've seen on the Court lately" for leaving
federal-state relationships chiefly to the political process. 20
Our final contributor, Professor Susan Herman of Brooklyn
Law School, notes that the Court has overturned twenty-five acts
of Congress in the past six years, far in excess of the 200-year
average of one a year.21 She deplores the current majority's
17 Cobens, 19 U.S. at 293 (holding that writ of error is not "within the amendment,
but is governed entirely by the Constitution as originally framed and.. that in its origin,
judicial power was extended to all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the U.S.
without respect to parties."). See Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and
Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1063 n. 75 (1999)
(surmising that Cohens Court concluded that Eleventh Amendment did not bar Court's
review of state criminal convictions); see also Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of
Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 579-580 (2001) (stating that Cohens Court held
that Eleventh Amendment does not apply when state is plaintiff).
18 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 307 (1986).
19 See Gibbons, supra note 15; see also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 582 U.S.
62, 73 (2000) (stating that "Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits
against non-consenting states"); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (stating that
states' immunity from suit is "fundamental aspect" of state sovereignty); College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1999)
(opining that Eleventh Amendment upholds sovereign immunity enjoyed by states before
they entered Union).
20 See Gibbons, supra note 15; Symposium, Roundtable: Negotiating the Constitution,
31 SETON HALL L. REV. 50, 55 (2000) (Gibbons foreseeing trouble for court as it takes on
task of enforcing legislative process under guise of judicial review). See generally Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues" Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1901-02 (2001) (citing HERBERT WECHLER, THE POLITICAL
SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM: THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN THE COMPOSITION AND
SELECTION OF THE NATURAL GOVERNMENT, 543 (1954) for the proposition that states'
position in political process obviated any need for judicial protection of states' rights
against national power); Lamar F. Jost, Constitutional Law - The Commerce Clause in
the New Millennium: Enumeration Still Presupposes Something Not Enumerated.
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), 1 WYO. L. REV. 195, 200 (2001) (citing
Marshall's broad deference to Congressional interpretation of its legislative authority
under Commerce Clause).
21 Susan Herman, Splitting the Atom of Marshall's Wisdom, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
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unwillingness to defer to Congress and, this Term in a Clean
Water Act decision, 22 to the executive branch as well. She argues
that, ironically, the recent decisions barring private suits against
states under acts of Congress involving wages, hours of work and
discrimination based on age and disability will engender more
actions by federal bureaucrats against states23-hardly
consistent with the present majority's professed concern for
states' rights.24
John Marshall's towering legacy continues to dominate our
understanding of the Constitution and the powers of the
judiciary, whatever the outcome of the current struggles over the
issues these essays describe. And as judicial review and
constitutional principles have been adopted in nation after
nation, he now commands a worldwide stage. The last word
undoubtedly belongs to John Adams, who appointed Marshall to
the Court, as cited by Charles Hobson: "[i]t was the pride of my
life that I have given to this nation a Chief Justice equal to Coke
or Hale, Holt or Mansfield."25
COMMENT. (forthcoming Spring 2002)
22 See Herman, supra note 21; see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (stating that grant
of authority to Congress under Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited).
23 See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-10 (2000) (showing court's unwillingness to
defer to broad interpretation of congressional authority under Commerce Clause); U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (showing court's unwillingness to defer to broad
interpretation of congressional authority under Commerce Clause); New York v. U.S., 505
U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (limiting federal power to regulate in realm that court fmds is states'
traditional province).
24 See Herman, supra note 21. But see, Archis Parasharami, Immunity as an
Essential Element of Statehood Alden v. Maine, 199 S Ct. 2240 (1999), 35 HARv. C.R. -
C. L. L. REV. 257, 258 (2000) (recognizing holding in Alden v. Maine as further step by
court's majority toward new regime where states' rights trump power of federal
government); Melanie K. St. Clair, A Return to States' Rights? The Rehnquist Court
Revives Federalism, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 412-13 (1998) (positing that decisions in
Printz v. US., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
represent "the Court's shift toward a new dynamic, one which reins in the power of
Congress and affords increased deference to the autonomy of the states."); John Aloysius
Farrell, Pragmatism, High- Profile Cases Constitutional 'Common Sense' is Applauded,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 29, 1997, at A12 (quoting Laurence Tribe, Harvard
Law Professor, "The court has clearly reaffirmed and underscored the depth of its
constitutional commitment to states' rights. The most consistent commitment of the
current court is probably to a vision of federalism that gives states considerably more
autonomy and protection from the national legislature than any court in decades has
done.")
25 Adams to Marshall, MARSHALL PAPERS, Aug. 17, 1825, quoted in SMITH, supra note
1, at 15.
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